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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SAGES, SAVAGES, AND OTHER SPEECH ACT COMMUNITIES:
CULTURE IN COMPARATIVE LAW
MONICA EPPINGER*
ABSTRACT
This Article re-examines the possible utility of the concept of culture in
comparative law. It reviews some limits and misuses of the concept of culture
and introduces a components approach to using it in comparative analysis.
First presented at a Symposium inspired by Laurence Tribe’s The Invisible
Constitution, the Article takes up a key question emerging from Tribe’s work:
How does a constitution constitute? Two conceptual tools from anthropology
and sister disciplines, performative speech acts and performance theory, lend
insight into how discourse produces literal meaning and, in parallel, produces
and reproduces speech act communities. Having introduced a components
approach to undertaking comparative work, the Article then suggests putting
the pieces back together; to demonstrate how a holistic treatment of culture
might be deployed in larger projects, the Article reviews one against racism
and another against ideology-based assertions of group superiority. With a
more analytical look at the work of “constituting” and with new tools for
studying it, the Article concludes that the concept of culture can facilitate
comparative analysis not only between different national jurisdictions, but also
between different speech act communities (like law and religion) within a
given jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of culture holds a paradoxical place in the field of
comparative law. On one hand, culture can be helpful in understanding and
comparing law across different jurisdictions and normative orders. Some
would even call culture indispensible to, or inseparable from, the project of
comparative law. On the other hand, the concept of culture is often vaguely
understood and the term “culture” wrongly or haphazardly used. Because some
misunderstand culture, they miss opportunities to deploy the concept
effectively. Worse, misused, the concept of culture can become a tool for
miscasting others and doing violence to their identities. This Article briefly
explores both sides of the paradox, considering utility and limits of the concept
of culture in comparative law.
The goal is to add some specificity to our understanding of the concept of
culture in order to harness the best and avoid the worst it may offer. I look to
anthropology, the discipline in the U.S. academy that pioneered the study of
culture, for tools useful to those seeking to understand law and its workings in
comparative perspective. My argument here is not primarily an ontological one
over the existence or non-existence of “culture.” Rather, it comes from a
practical acceptance that the concept of culture has pragmatic effect and must
be reckoned with.
The 2012 Center for International and Comparative Law Symposium at
which this paper was presented took inspiration from constitutional scholar
Lawrence Tribe’s recent work, The Invisible Constitution.1 This Article takes
Tribe’s discussion as a point of departure for considering culture. I analyze
Tribe’s argument, characterize the mechanisms he identifies, and use some
tools from anthropology to address anew Tribe’s central research question.
This is done as an experiment, something of a “proof of concept,” for adapting
the anthropological tool kit to comparative law. Reference to Tribe’s work is
meant to be illustrative. The body of the argument itself has two main points:
caution and explanation.
Part I reviews Tribe’s propositions for how the invisible Constitution has
been generated. It then explores the concept of culture in relation to the
invisible Constitution, explaining why one might characterize the genre of the
mechanism he identifies as “culture” (despite his protestations). Part II
explores how the study of culture can help in a project like Tribe’s. It proposes
a “components method” and reviews two lines of work, performative speech
acts and performance theory, which anthropology and sister disciplines have
developed that give insight into how a constitution might do the work of
constituting, e.g., how speech acts create social reality. This leads to
consideration of frames of performance, within which discourse produces

1. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008).
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literal meaning and, in parallel, produces and reproduces speech act
communities. Part III describes some limits and misuses of the concept of
culture in comparative analysis. Armed with a dual understanding of the work
of “constituting” and cautioned against pitfalls, Part IV reintroduces culture
with a look at two major projects in which it has been deployed, resituating
speech act analysis within a broader context and drawing on the work of two
anthropologists, Franz Boas and Laura Nader, to illustrate some further benefit
of considering culture.
The Article concludes with a consideration of the possible utility of the
concept of culture for comparative law, showing how tools from anthropology
allow us to describe and explain the constitution of different kinds of
communities defined by speech acts, including law and religion. This
facilitates comparative analysis not only between different national
jurisdictions, as is the dominant tradition in comparative law, but also between
different speech act communities (like law and religion) within a given
national jurisdiction. More fundamentally, it may help us understand how
authority or power works in different speech acts communities and to compare
how the forces that constitute are produced and reproduced. The piece should
point the reader towards equipment for analyzing with greater nuance how the
Constitution and other authorized speech acts constitute, when the focus is not
what a constitution says, but on how it does what it does. It is this focus that
arises in dialogue with Tribe.2
I. TAKING THE INVISIBLE SERIOUSLY
A.

The Invisible Constitution

The Invisible Constitution, constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe’s
recent work, raises a question that would seem central to the study of
constitutions but is rarely considered: How does the Constitution constitute?
After all, Tribe points out, the Constitution leaves many gaps that will
inevitably give rise to disputes. However, it does not also in its text give a rule
for its interpretation.3 Tribe makes a case for the existence of propositions and
precepts not written in—but nonetheless part of—the Constitution, arguing for
the “existence of extratextual content” as part of the Constitution.4 In other
words, Tribe sees smoke (the existence of certain patterns of behavior by those
acting in response to the Constitution) and infers fire. Describing that fire is the
aim of his book.

2. See, e.g., id. at 22.
3. Id. at 4.
4. Margaret Raymond, Book Review, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 466, 466 (2008–2010)
(reviewing Tribe’s The Invisible Constitution).
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Tribe, in his own words, is not trying to add to the body of literature on
who is doing the interpreting or what is invisible around the constitution. In
investigating this “invisible constitution,” Tribe means to exclude what he
considers outside the text, the “complex superstructure of rules, doctrines,
standards, legal tests, judicial precedents, legislative and executive practices,
and cultural and social traditions that together constitute what people call
‘constitutional law.’”5 Instead, he focuses on what must be “‘in’ the United
States Constitution but cannot be seen when one reads only its text.”6 In,
outside, around: metaphors of space are indispensible to Tribe’s project but are
left undefined by him.
In the discussion to follow, I use the basic question Tribe raises, “How
does a Constitution constitute?”, to undertake a broader reconsideration of
culture in comparative law. Reexamination entails redrawing some of the
boundaries by which Tribe marks what is intrinsic or extrinsic to his
discussion. Most generally, Tribe says “culture” falls outside of the scope of
his discussion. In examining his data and his claims, however, I find his
material is indistinguishable from “culture,” as technically defined by
anthropology. I then try to restore to him tools that the prior study of culture
has developed to make sense of it, tools of which he robs himself by separating
his topic from “culture.” The subsequent parts of this section explain how I get
from point A to point B, and why it matters.
B.

Invisible Constitution and Culture

To begin, let’s consider Tribe’s challenge and how he tackles it. Tribe,
convinced that the “invisible Constitution” is at the heart of the Constitution’s
meaning, aims to move “the nation’s constitutional conversation away from
debates over what the Constitution says and whether various constitutional
claims are properly rooted in its written text and toward debates over what the
Constitution does.”7 To do this, he undertakes to describe the content, “both
written and unwritten,” of the Constitution.8
In this pursuit, he makes several analytical moves. First, he identifies a set
of axiomatic propositions that “go beyond anything that could reasonably be
said to follow simply from what the Constitution expressly says,”9 for
example:
Ours is a “government of the people, by the people, for the people.”
Ours is a “government of laws, not men.”

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

TRIBE, supra note 1, at 10.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 28.
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We are committed to the “rule of law.”
Courts must not automatically defer to what elected officials decide the
Constitution means.
Government may not torture people to force information out of them.
In each person’s intimate private life, there are limits to what government may
control.
Congress may not commandeer states as though they were agencies or
departments of the federal government.
10

No state may secede from the Union.

After discussing evidence (in doctrine and judicial decisions) that for him
supports that each one of those propositions exists, Tribe describes logical
processes by which, per his inference, the content of the invisible Constitution
has been generated. He identifies three constructive principles: geometric
construction (“connecting the dots”);11 geodesic construction (surfaces that
surround an interior defined by a core right or principle whose realization
requires “space buffered from outside forces by a suitably designed shield”);12
and global construction (“comparison of our national experience with the
experiences and experiments of other nations and of international groupings,
institutions, and practices”).13 He adds three deconstructive “modes of
construction,” deconstructive in that they “entail imagining how the
Constitution would break down or fall apart unless certain assumptions were
made”:14 geological construction (unearthing the roots or presumptions of
textually identified rights);15 gravitational construction (“the ‘anti-slipperyslope’ mode”);16 and gyroscopic construction (a Constitution stabilized by both
centripetal and centrifugal vector forces).17 In short, Tribe observes the smoke
of axiomatic propositions and infers the fire of cognitive patterns (or
“principles,” in his terminology) that explains their generation. In what genre
do his “principles” fall, and through what paradigm of analysis might they be
apprehended?
Although Tribe specifies that culture lies outside of the domain he wants to
consider, I propose that instead that “culture,” canonically defined, is exactly
what he is attempting to describe. “Culture,” as a technical term in
anthropology, is canonically characterized as “all the elements in man’s [sic]

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 28−29.
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 157.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 155–56.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 198.
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 207.
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mature endowment that he has acquired from his group by conscious learning
or by a conditioning process.”18 This might mean a “systematic body of
learned behavior” transmitted from prior to subsequent generations.19 In the
tradition of American anthropology, culture is understood as material and
ideational,20 manifest in institutions, material objects, and thought patterns.21
Tribe identifies two phenomena, 1) propositions22 that form the content of the
invisible Constitution, and 2) forms of logical reasoning or principles of
constitutional construction—in other words, patterns of cognition—that Tribe
speculates give rise to the propositions. I propose that both of these phenomena
would be considered integral to culture in the canonical understanding of
“culture” in anthropology.
My first challenge to his model is to a distinction he draws between
interior and exterior. Tribe locates both the propositions and the cognitive
patterns, or “principles,” “in” the Constitution although they are not seen or
written there, interior yet invisible.23 In this, he distinguishes them from other
devices (a “complex superstructure” of practices and “cultural and social
traditions”) that are neither in the written Constitution nor even his “invisible”
Constitution.24 He may be using the word “culture” colloquially, but it is worth
pointing out this point of dissonance. The propositions and the principles Tribe
identifies are patterns of cognition and practice that anthropology would
identify as manifestations of culture. If Tribe’s extratextual propositions are
“in” the Constitution, then culture is in the Constitution.
Incidentally, in considering patterns of cognition, Tribe shares ground with
other recent forays in legal scholarship that identify patterns of thought and use
them as bases for explanation of outcomes of legal argument or policy

18. MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, CULTURAL DYNAMICS 3 (abr. ed. 1964).
19. Margaret Mead, Preface to RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE xi, xi (Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1989) (1934).
20. See, e.g., Franz Boas, The History of Anthropology, address at the International College
of Arts and Science, St. Louis, September 1904, as published in 5 CONGRESS OF ARTS AND
SCIENCE 468 (H. J. Rogers, ed. 1906), reprinted in A FRANZ BOAS READER: THE SHAPING OF
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY, 1883-1911, 23, 23 (George W. Stocking, Jr., ed., 1974)
(“[A]nthropologists occupy themselves with problems relating to the physical and mental life of
mankind as found in varying forms of society . . . .”).
21. HERSKOVITS, supra note 18, at 3.
22. These propositions, see supra text accompanying note 10, seem to be of different genres:
some precepts, others ideologies, others hypotheses, etc. Without delving into further analysis, I
refer to them generally as “propositions.”
23. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 13−29.
24. Id. at 10.
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debate.25 The most prolific of these recent efforts, unlike Tribe, does identify
cognition as a manifestation of culture.26
C. Question Asked Versus Question Answered
I propose that two research questions are central to Tribe’s project: the
question he raises, and the question he answers. Summarizing from his
description of his project, the basic question that he raises is, how does the
Constitution constitute?27 Tribe hypothesizes the existence of invisible
elements that are not written in the Constitution, but that somehow control how
the Constitution is interpreted and thus are inextricably a part of it. Those
elements may be received unspoken cues; they recall the cues in Bateson’s
example that tell a bear cub when its sibling is biting in play versus when its
sibling is biting in aggression, which determine the interpretation of two
different communicative acts that in their formal aspects look identical.28
Alternatively, those elements may be patterns of thought or habits of mind that
give rise to the same or similar inferences in different individuals reading the
same text. Putting aside for a moment the exact nature of the extratextual
phenomena, I will refer to them for now in general terms as “metadiscursive
devices.” Accordingly, I would rephrase Tribe’s central research question as,
how do metadiscursive devices generate the invisible Constitution?
That, however, is different than the question I find that he answers in his
work. The question he answers is, instead, more along the lines of, assuming
that an “invisible Constitution” exists, i.e., assuming a set of metadiscursive
cues do guide constitutional interpretation but are not specified in the
Constitution itself, which ones can I identify as the content of the invisible
Constitution? Taking his set of propositions, his answer to that question, as
true for the sake of argument, we are still left with the questions of how and
whence those principles or patterns of cognition arise. Tribe seems to be
making an argument about discourse formation in U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence, suggesting relationships between language and patterns of
cognition.
This leads back to the intellectual heritage of anthropology. Language
specialists and American cultural anthropologists have long investigated

25. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A
Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1294–95 (2003).
26. For work using cognition as a manifestation of culture more generally, see THE
CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL, www.culturalcognition.net (last visited
Sept. 27, 2012).
27. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1−8.
28. For analysis of signaling devices taking animal biting in play versus aggression as its
central example, see Gregory Bateson, A Theory of Play and Fantasy, in GREGORY BATESON,
STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF MIND 179 (Chandler Pub. Co., 1972).
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relationships between language and cognition,29 developing conceptual tools
for the task. In this Part, I have argued that, under technical definitions offered
by anthropology, Tribe has misdiagnosed his problem and may thus have
missed some tools that could aid his project. In the next Part, I describe some
of them. First, I propose a possible starting point for those considering the
concept of culture in comparative legal analysis, and then I describe a few
examples of the conceptual tools it may place at their disposal.
II. THE WORK OF CONSTITUTING
A.

Getting Started

I propose as a first step towards reconceptualizing culture, we draw an
analogy from physics. One may think about culture, I propose, in the way that
contemporary physics conceives the atom.30 An atom is composed of building
blocks, i.e., protons, neutrons, and electrons. To visualize where an electron
may be located in relation to the protons and neutrons of a nucleus, physics
proposes the image of a cloud,31 denser in some areas than others, depicting the
set of probabilities that an electron may be observed; the denser the cloud, the
more likely an electron may be observed. A set of probabilities, then, describes
the relationship between nucleus and electrons. We might similarly think of
culture as a set of probabilities of relations. These could be relations between
people, between ideas, or other building blocks. The building blocks or the
relations between them could then be subject to analysis.
A related methodological suggestion comes from British social
anthropologist Adam Kuper, who harbors some skepticism about the concept
of “culture.”32 Kuper suggests that an investigator think through carefully what
she has in mind and analyze the components of what is lumped under the term
“culture” separately and specifically. Instead of “culture,” for example, Kuper
suggests analyzing language, religion, family, law, or another component of
culture relevant to the question at hand.33
Taking Kuper’s advice—not using “culture” as an explanatory principle
and instead breaking down and analyzing components of culture relevant to a
29. See, e.g., BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, Science and Linguistics, in COLLECTED PAPERS ON
METALINGUISTICS 1, 5 (1952); Edward Sapir, Conceptual Categories in Primitive Languages, 74
SCI. 578, 578 (1931).
30. The information for this analogy comes from Nuclear Energy, SNEWS, available at
http://snews.bnl.gov/popsci/nuclear-energy.html.
31. The “cloud” is a metaphor for Schrödinger’s “wave function.” See generally Erwin
Schrödinger, An Undulatory Theory of the Mechanics of Atoms and Molecules, 28 PHYSICAL
REV. 1049 (1926).
32. See generally ADAM KUPER, CULTURE: THE ANTHROPOLOGISTS’ ACCOUNT (1999). See
infra Part III for discussion of a few of my points of caution.
33. Id. at 245.
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particular research question—I return to looking at law as a discursive practice
and in particular looking at how constitutions constitute. To illustrate how
Kuper’s approach might work, in the rest of this Part, I isolate one component
of culture relevant to Tribe’s project, language, to look at how speech,
language, and other communicative practices work to construct social reality.
B.

Performative Speech

One component particularly relevant for the project of explaining how
metadiscursive cues help to construct an invisible Constitution is speech or
speech acts. John Austin’s work on performative speech acts may get us
started. Austin distinguishes cases in which language is used to represent
reality, “constative utterances,” from cases in which words create reality,
“performative utterances.”34 In law school, much of what we study is how to
execute effectively performative speech acts: a contract is a performative
speech act; a verdict is a performative speech act. These are not instances of
language representing but of language creating. That is my first proposal from
reflecting on how constitutions constitute: constitutions constitute through
performative speech acts.
Austin indicates that not every attempted use of speech to create reality
does create reality. What aspects distinguish the performative deployment of a
sign-type? He identifies “felicity conditions,” conditions that must be satisfied
for a performative to be effective in creating social reality.35 One is
convention: “accepted conventional procedure”36 must be followed to execute
a performative utterance. Following convention may be interpreted as
evidencing a certain inner state,37 which is itself a separate felicity condition.38
To be taken seriously, as opposed to, say, joking or writing a poem, a speaker
must render a performative utterance, in accordance with an accepted custom,
as an “outward and visible sign, for convenience or other record or for
information, of an inward and spiritual act.”39
The felicity of an Austinian performative depends on a third pre-existing
social form, authority. One test of the felicity of a performative utterance for
Austin is whether the particular persons and circumstances in a given case are

34. J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 47 (photo. reprint 1967) (1962). For
description, and critique, of a logical parallel from the history of comparative law, see Monica
Eppinger, Governing in the Vernacular: Eugen Ehrlich and Late Habsburg Ethnography, in
LIVING LAW: RECONSIDERING EUGEN EHRLICH 21, 24–25 (Marc Hertogh ed., 2009).
35. AUSTIN, supra note 34, at 14−15.
36. Id. at 14, 26. Austin refers to convention elsewhere by such terms as “ceremon[y],” id. at
76, or “formula,” id. at 60.
37. Id. at 9.
38. Id. at 15.
39. Id. at 9.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

SAGES, SAVAGES, AND OTHER SPEECH ACT COMMUNITIES

417

appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure involved.40 This
makes the effect of an utterance dependent on a historical moment and a social
and cultural setting; for example, the social roles of speaker and listener
determine the appropriate convention for a performative utterance. Authorized
(or “ratified,” in Erving Goffman’s term)41 speakers derive authority from an
implicit feature of Austin’s model, context.42
The felicity conditions may provide points of focus for our work in
comparative law. In Austin’s suggestions for how to evaluate effectiveness of
performatives, we are directed to mechanisms—convention, affective state,
authority—that determine what kinds of propositions rise to a sense of an
“invisible constitution” and which ones sink to “sound and fury, signifying
nothing.”43 Examination of the substance of those felicity conditions inevitably
leads us to other components of culture that should then be included in our
analysis.
Let me offer an example: I conducted fieldwork in law and social change,
i.e., in how performative speech acts work to constitute social reality, in postSoviet Ukraine.44 It was through performative speech acts that a giant, wellarmed country disappeared from world maps without a shot fired, and reality
was changed. Did Soviet structures of thought, action, self-formation, or
identity disappear overnight, in all ways, for everybody? No. Structures
remained, evacuated of some content, but structuring structures nonetheless.
We can observe what new content is filling those structures, areas of slippage,
innovations in performance, and through those observations, we can “reverse
engineer” and infer who created the authority to create what came next. We
can understand how power is getting constituted within this ruptured context.
As this example shows, analyzing one component of culture with tools
developed for the task can illuminate broader aspects of law, culture, and
society in comparative perspective.
While Austinian performatives offer a promising start, searching the
history of utterances for performative felicity—identifying performative
speech acts—is not entirely satisfying, in part because it is not peculiar to
constitutions. It is the way law generally works. It is also, by the way, how
some parts of religious tradition also work. (In some religious stories of the
Judeo-Christian tradition, for example, we put words into the mouth of God,
40. Id. at 15, 34.
41. Erving Goffman, The Neglected Situation, in LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 61, 65
(Pier Paolo Giglioli ed., 1972).
42. AUSTIN, supra note 34, at 76 (one of the devices that can convey that a given utterance is
meant to be performative is “the circumstances of the utterance”).
43. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 5, sc. 5.
44. For a summary of the research project, see Monica Eppinger, Parliamentarians,
Farmers, and Other Legal Subjects: Law and Experimentation in Independent Ukraine,
ANTHROPOLOGY NEWS, December 2012, at 5.
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casting God in the role of maker of performative speech. “‘Let there be light,’
and there was light,”45 is a paradigmatic example of how words create, in our
cosmology.) Performative speech acts work in different kinds of language
communities, not just legal communities—in religious communities, and other
kinds of communities.
The bill that Representative Paul Curtman introduced into the Missouri
legislature outlawing the use of “foreign law” in Missouri court decisions46 (a
project discussed with Representative Curtman at the 2012 CICL
Symposium),47 reminds us that there are different spheres of authority, and
there are different ways that authority gets constituted. Representative Curtman
may be wrong in conflating religious community with legal community and in
perceiving a minority community’s speech acts as threatening, or even
relevant, to the majority secular legal community; but Curtman’s alarm still
signifies a certain kind of structural assessment of commensurability of
performative speech, and thereby of legitimacy of authority, and in that,
perhaps, a form of respect.
C. Performance
This begs the question, then: If words can create social reality, and if the
felicity of a performative utterance depends on certain features like authority,
convention, and context, then where do those features come from? In addition
to Austinian performative speech, linguistic anthropology suggests another
way that words create reality, this time over longer duration, in a body of work
called performance theory.48 In analyzing performance, we see how repetition
over time also creates reality. It takes a short ceremony, punctuated by a brief
set of performative utterances, for two people to become newlyweds. It takes
significantly longer to establish the convention or ceremony by which two
people may become married. It takes reiteration, a kind of repeat performance
over time; it also takes acceptability, performing in a way that will be accepted
by the audience.49 The features of Austin’s felicity conditions—those features
upon which performatives are premised, like convention and authority—take
time to accumulate. This indicates one relationship between performance and
45. Genesis 1:3.
46. Mo. H.B. No. 1512, 96th General Assembly, Second Regular Session, “An Act to
Amend Chapter 506, RSMo, by Adding thereto One New Section relating to the laws of other
countries,” (2011).
47. Rep. Paul Curtman, Remarks at Saint Louis University School of Law Symposium:
Invisible Constitutions (Mar. 2, 2012), http://slu.edu/school-of-law-home/faculty-and-administra
tion/news-and-events/events/culture-religion-and-memory/videos.
48. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, Performances, in THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN
EVERYDAY LIFE 17 (1973).
49. Id. at 17 (“When an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take
seriously the impression that is fostered before them.”).
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performativity. The felicity of performative speech acts depends on frames of
performance,50 which are themselves created over time by repetition.
In this understanding of “performance,” a performance frame is not
something that one enters, as into a temporary, artificial setting only to exit
back to reality. Rather, in this understanding of performance, one steps from
frame into frame. “All the world’s a stage,” as Shakespeare tells us,51 or at
least all the world’s one stage after another, wherein each stage is a set of
probabilities that the performance that one is making might not be accepted by
one’s audience. As Professor An-Na’im points out, we all have—or rather,
perform—multiple identities.52 An uncountable and sometimes uncomfortable
number of identities. We cultivate or embody multiple identities in part in
order to engage in the co-creation of reality with the people with whom we
interact. Culture in both its ideational and material manifestations provides the
setting for performance, the framing. Frames of performance define the
domain, or fields, of probability that the audience will participate in the cocreation of reality over long duration. This is not to claim that every
performative speech act or performance bears equal weight or influence on
subsequent ones. It is, however, to give each performance its due as an
experience in its own right and for its role in the reproduction of performance
frames. To re-purpose Bruce Ackerman’s term,53 in the practice of law, then,
each moment is a small-c constitutional moment, a moment of constitution,
construction, re-creation, creation anew.54
What is at stake in all of this? Speech acts are the building blocks of
discourses of inclusion and exclusion. They create in-groups and out-groups.
Are we going to outlaw the application of some foreign law doctrines in state
court? Are we going to say that certain kinds of speech acts are not going to be
performative in our context? What is “our” context? Does that not depend on
who we think “we” are? And does not our answer determine who “we” will or
can be tomorrow? It is via a dialogic process between speakers and audiences
that social reality is constituted. When we repeat speech acts in certain

50. See ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
EXPERIENCE 22 (Northeastern University Press 1986) (1974).
51. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, AS YOU LIKE IT act 2, sc. 7.
52. Abullahi An-Na’im, Banning Sharia is a “Red Herring”: The Way Forward for All
Americans, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 295 (2013).
53. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6–7 (1991); 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 87 (1998).
54. In this formulation of the temporality at issue, at least, I find common ground with Tribe.
See TRIBE, supra note 1, at 6 (stating a major difference between other scholars’ approaches and
his is that “they focus on the way crucial turning points in our constitutional history
(‘constitutional moments’) depend for their legitimacy on sources of law outside the
Constitution’s text, whereas I focus on the way the Constitution at every moment depends on
extratextual sources of meaning”).
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discursive traditions, we are making choices about who’s in and who’s out,
who is authorized to create certain forms of reality and who is not. Culture and
individuals are, in this vision of the constituting process, co-creative.
The prior Parts aimed first at using Tribe’s “invisible constitution” to
illustrate some conceptual tools American anthropology has developed from
past study of culture and then at equipping the comparative legal scholar with
them. Despite the utility of bringing the concept of culture to bear on
comparative legal analysis, some serious misgivings about arguing for its
adoption arise. To address some of them, the next Part issues a few caveats
about the limits and possible misuses of the concept of culture.
III. CAUTIONING AGAINST CULTURE: FOUR COMMON PITFALLS
A.

Stasis

Caution would warn us away from taking our notion of culture too
literally, for several reasons. Culture, understood as learned or inherited
elements,55 has long been easily confused with tradition. The repetition or
reproduction of culture without change (literally, stereotyping56), has proved
untrue in every known human group yet studied. There is no such thing as a
human group living unchanged over time. Tradition may function as a
performance frame, but it too changes with reiteration. The existence of
tradition should not be confused for its tyranny. When faced with groups that
seem to have something in common with our imagination of our own past, or
our imagination of the other group’s past, then we are apt to overlook
iterability, emergence, or slippage. Given long prior association of the concept
of culture with the idea of tradition, the tendency for confusion is rampant. The
concept of culture should be avoided if it abets an assumption of stasis.
B.

Reification

Using the concept of culture is even more problematic when we observers
and scholars enlist it in self-deception, allowing our understanding of culture, a
construct in the mind of the beholder57 to become confused with culture as an a
priori object. As one anthropologist warned a half-century ago,
55. See Mead, supra note 19.
56. Originally, “stereotype” referred to a duplicate printing plate in a press, used to stamp
identical copies of typography. See WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 54−55 (1922)
(adopting of this image as a metaphor for human perception of others).
57. See, e.g., PAUL RABINOW, Humanism as Nihilism: The Bracketing of Truth and
Seriousness in American Anthropology, in THE ACCOMPANIMENT: ASSEMBLING THE
CONTEMPORARY 13, 29 (2011) (“What we do as anthropologists is construct interpretations of
what we take to be other peoples’ realities. The writing of ethnography is what makes us
anthropologists. We create fictions. These ethnographic fictions are constructs of other people’s
constructs.”)
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[W]hen culture is closely analyzed, we find but a series of patterned
reactions that characterize the behavior of the members of a given group. That
is, we find people reacting, people behaving, people thinking, people
rationalizing. Under these circumstances, it becomes clear that what we do is
to reify, that is, objectify and make concrete, the experiences of individuals in
a group at a given time. These we gather into a totality we call their culture.
And, for purposes of study, this is quite proper. The danger point is reached
when we reify similarities in behavior that only result from the similar
conditioning of a group of individuals to their common setting into something
that exists outside man . . . This does not mean that we deny the usefulness, for
certain anthropological problems, of studying culture as if it had an objective
existence. But we must not allow the recognition of a methodological need to
58
obscure the fact that we are dealing with a construct . . . .

A second reason for caution, then, is that we have tended to reify “culture” as
if it has an objective existence.
C. Excuse
Third, and more dangerous, when used to explain observed differences in
behavior or outcomes, “culture” can become a counterproductive substitute for
thought. Here, “culture” could fall into the same category, or be pressed into
the same service, as Gregory Bateson’s “black box.” Bateson explains, via an
imaginary dialogue between a father and daughter:
A ‘black box’ is a conventional agreement between scientists to stop trying to
explain things at a certain point. I guess it’s usually a temporary agreement
. . . . It’s a word that comes from the engineers. When they draw a diagram of a
complicated machine, they use a sort of shorthand. Instead of drawing all the
details, they put a box to stand for a whole bunch of parts and label the box
with what the bunch of parts is supposed to do.
Daughter: So a ‘black box’ is a label for what a bunch of things are supposed
to do . . . .
Father: That’s right. But it’s not an explanation of how the bunch works.

59

A “black box,” then, can stand for a series of elements understood to stand
in relation to each other without attempting to explain how, in conjunction with
each other, they work. If used thoughtlessly (i.e., without careful consideration
about what is meant within), the “black box” of “culture” can become a default
stand-in for explanation, inquiry, or thought, actually empty of content. The
use of the term “culture” in comparative legal scholarship often stands as an
example of the lure of the empty referent. When we do not understand why a
law works one way in Missouri but a different way in Mississippi or yet a
58. HERSKOVITS, supra note 18, at 13; see also RABINOW, supra note 57, at 15.
59. GREGORY BATESON, Metalogue: What is an Instinct?, in STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF
MIND 38, 39–40 (1983).
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different way in Ukraine, “culture” may be offered as a reason, without further
elaboration or specificity. As a facile substitution for explanation, then, the
term “culture” can become a parking lot for sloppy thinking about causality.
In this usage, “culture” can also become a blanket label for difference, and
when used in that way, it can do us a disservice in a number of different ways.
One is that it lumps together others’ differences into an unanalyzed and
unanalyzable mass. Another is that it allows us to take for granted our own
culture, the way we are, even who “we” are. It can facilitate the unexamined
reception of normative categories. In that, it can strip us of the opportunity to
exercise “comparative consciousness.”60 “Culture,” if offered as an explanation
in and of itself, can become a substitute for thinking carefully or specifically.61
D. Orientalizing
One more related word of caution regarding culture: “culture,” used
carelessly, can become a technology for essentializing. To repeat Herskovits’s
admonition: “The danger point is reached when we reify similarities in
behavior that only result from the similar conditioning of a group of
individuals to their common setting into something that exists outside man . . .
.”62 This is related to the assumption that a culture is (or can be) a “bounded”
group which one still may meet. Anthropologists warn that investigation into
culture can, with reification, turn into asserting “essential” qualities of one’s
own group or others’.63 The use of the concept of culture as cover for
essentializing approximates what Edward Said called “Orientalizing,” which
he warned against, more than three decades ago.64 In this, too, deploying the
term “culture” in comparative law can become dangerous when it is accepted
as a substitute for thinking.
60. Laura Nader, Comparative Consciousness, in ASSESSING CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY
84, 86 (Robert Borofsky ed., 1994).
61. This is the most significant objection Adam Kuper raises against “culture” that I share.
See KUPER, supra note 32.
62. HERSKOVITS, supra note 18, at 13.
63. See, e.g., Andrew Apter, Africa, Empire, and Anthropology: A Philological Exploration
of Anthropology’s Heart of Darkness, 28 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 577, 580–81 (1999)
(“[D]oes not an implicit racial logic—cloaked in the essentializing categories of native
administration and customary law—slip unnoticed through the back door? Insofar as modern
Africanist ethnography has sought pristine models of social structures . . . and systems of
thought . . . has it not endorsed the fundamental objectifying, essentializing, and even implicit
racializing of imperial science at large?”); see also, e.g., Thomas Abercrombie, To Be Indian, to
Be Bolivian: “Ethnic” and “National” Discourses of Identity, in NATION-STATES AND INDIANS
IN LATIN AMERICA 95, 97–98 (Greg Urban & Joel Sherzer eds., 1991) (warning against falling
victim to an “essentializing stereotype of ‘the Indian’” and against “essentializing a Hispanic
urban culture”) (“In the Andes, an ‘urban,’ ‘Hispanic’ or ‘European’ culture exists, like an
‘Indian’ one, only when we are studying stereotypes.”).
64. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 5 (1979).
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How susceptible are we to “essentializing” or “Orientalizing”? The title I
choose for this Article is one example. The original title ran along the lines of
“Bringing Comparison Home.” As I thought about comparative law and the
concept of culture, I realized that the lure of the exotic “other” is part of the
construct, part of the air we breathe and water we drink (a metaphor that works
as long as we understand that it is air we have engineered for ourselves and
water we have synthesized). The title of this Article should arouse suspicion.
The perplexing erotic might be a draw;65 the elision of erotic and exotic, if
history is a guide, is a danger.
The foregoing argues that the concept of culture, and tools developed for
studying it, has much to offer comparative analysis. However, this
endorsement issues cautiously, and the argument proceeds to identify several
common pitfalls in drawing on concepts of culture. One helpful start may be
taking a “components approach,” and zeroing in on a particular facet of culture
in working on a particular problem, for example, language and speech acts to
understand how constitutions constitute. Even this approach bears a caveat
against assuming a fixed category, a reified object, or stasis. Language, in
living usage, is not a fixed set of combinations of phonemes. It is more like an
aggregation of the probabilities of finding certain things in relation to each
other, or finding certain patterns, probabilities with which speakers
pragmatically play.
And here, one last caveat is in order, parting company with Kuper. Once
analysis of a particular component has been undertaken, it can also distort the
picture if one fails to “put the pieces back together,” to reassemble a wider
picture to see how the component under analysis works within a broader frame.
This returns us to the tradition in American anthropology of taking a holistic
view of culture. As “proof of concept,” the following Part briefly describes
how the concept of culture has been deployed by two American
anthropologists in the service of larger projects.
IV. THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE, DEPLOYED
A.

Culture Against Race

It would be useful at this point to review how the concept of culture has
been deployed in larger arguments, and to what effect. This review offers two
examples. In the first, from early in its history, American anthropology uses
the concept of culture in a fight against a particular manifestation of
ethnocentrism, racism. This project is most prominently associated with the
German-Jewish father of American study of culture, Franz Boas. The

65. William Desmond, Being, Determination, and Dialectic, in BEING AND DIALECTIC:
METAPHYSICS AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE (William Desmond and Joseph Grange, eds., 2000).
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challenge that faced Boas in the late 1800s and early into the 1900s was that
Americans and Europeans observed differences in material culture, between
groups that produced particular material goods like guns or locomotive
engines, and others that did not. From observations of difference in material
culture, Boas’s contemporaries evinced a tendency to draw inferences about
racially-based aptitudes. Why did Americans and Europeans have certain
weapons, or modes of transport, or other seeming advantages in technology
and forms of material culture as compared with other groups, in other parts of
the world? Some inferred that the capacity to create certain forms of
technological innovation was based on racially based aptitudes.
Boas entered the fray with systematic study of groups’ differences based
on long-term residence, careful observation, and close discussion with the
people that he studied to learn the ways that they categorized their own
experience.66 Boas argued that the scope of human history—the stuff of
anthropology, considering what makes us human since the early origins of the
species—argues against any kind of racial determinism.67 He reminded his
audiences and readerships of the empirical evidence of great building projects
in human antiquity, among groups that subsequently lost technological
advantage over others who in turn left their own impressive relics.68 He also
reminded his contemporaries that even the great building civilizations of
antiquity, of Mesopotamia or the upper Nile, were never composed of one
“racial” group but rather incorporated cosmopolitan mixes of peoples.69 Boas
ruled out race: of the many things that might lead to certain kinds of
technological breakthroughs or relative advantages, race was not among
them.70 In its place, he argued “culture.” It was a shared, learned body of
knowledge passed down from person to person within a group, rather than a set

66. See, e.g., Franz Boas, A Year among the Eskimo, 19 BULL. AM. GEOG. SOC’Y 383
(1887), reprinted in A FRANZ BOAS READER: THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY,
1883-1911, 44−45, (George W. Stocking, Jr., ed., 1974).
67. See, e.g., Franz Boas, Human Faculty as Determined by Race, Address as Vice-President
of Section H before the Section of Anthropology of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science at the Brooklyn Meeting, August 1894, in 43 Proceedings 301 (1894),
reprinted in A FRANZ BOAS READER: THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY, 1883-1911,
221, 221−42 (George W. Stocking, Jr., ed., 1974) [hereinafter Boas, Human Faculty].
68. See, e.g., Franz Boas, The History of Anthropology, Address at the International
Congress of Arts and Science, St. Louis, September 1904, in 5 CONGRESS OF ARTS AND
SCIENCE, 468 (H.J. Rogers, ed., 1906), reprinted in A FRANZ BOAS READER: THE SHAPING OF
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY, 1883-1911, 23, 34 (George W. Stocking, Jr., ed., 1974) [hereinafter
Boas, History of Anthropology Address].
69. Id. at 29.
70. See, e.g., Franz Boas, Human Faculty, supra note 67; see also George W. Stocking, Jr.,
The Basic Assumptions of Boasian Anthropology, in A FRANZ BOAS READER: THE SHAPING OF
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY, 1883-1911, 1, 6 (George W. Stocking, Jr., ed. 1974) [hereinafter
Stocking, Basic Assumptions]; Rabinow, supra note 57, at 14.
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of aptitudes based on racial superiority or inferiority, that determined what got
built and what did not, what forms of material culture became manifest or not
in a given place.71
After Boas, generations of anthropologists have redeployed the concept of
culture in the argument against racism.72 Part of the anthropological tradition
of ethnography, an attempt at holistic treatment, supported the insight that
more visible manifestations of culture like buildings or machines are not safe
grounds for inferences about simplicity or complexity of less visible
manifestations, such as cosmology, of human reasoning, aptitude, or thought.
Boas’s legacy includes a second step in his deployment of the concept of
culture as an alternative explanation for differences that others linked to race or
ethnicity. He also argued not only that our measures were misleading, but that
the yardstick itself was rigged; that we measured others by a yardstick that was
itself a product of our own culture whereas others are only fairly measured by
their own yardsticks.73 He deployed the concept of culture against a cognitive
bias that we now refer to as “ethnocentrism,”74 the second step in his larger
project of arguing against racial or other sub-group bases of superiority or
inferiority. The widespread acceptance of the concept of cultural relativism is
one of the great achievements of Boas’s work,75 accomplished with the
conceptual tool of the concept of culture.
B.

Culture Against Ideology

Recall that Boas found culture manifest in material items and in ideas. He
used the concept of culture to argue against contemporaries who looked at
differences in material manifestations of culture—e.g., certain forms of
technology—and inferred the superiority or inferiority of groups. Materially
based, racist logic may be more suspect today, but a parallel to the logic that
Boas encountered does hold currency among some today: inferring superiority
or inferiority of groups based on perceived differences in ideational
manifestations of culture. A second major project in which I find the concept
of culture deployed is in argument against this tendency.

71. See, e.g., Boas, History of Anthropology Address, supra note 68; see also Stocking,
Basic Assumptions, supra note 70, at 3.
72. See, e.g., Race: Are We So Different?, AM. ANTHROP. SOC’Y, http://www.understanding
race.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2013) (public education project on race conducted under the aegis
of the American Anthropological Society).
73. See, e.g., Boas, History of Anthropology Address, supra note 68, at 31.
74. See, e.g., Stocking, Basic Assumptions, supra note 70, at 6; Rabinow, supra note 57, at
18.
75. Rabinow, supra note 57, at 20.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

426

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:407

I find one example of this work in contemporary anthropologist Laura
Nader’s analysis of the function of an ideology of “the rule of law.”76 Just as
some of Boas’s contemporaries sought to export perceived advantages of
material culture, some of Nader’s contemporaries perceive others as lacking
“the rule of law” (or forms of economic development thought contingent upon
it), and therefore in need of intervention.77 Just as some of Boas’s
contemporaries were moved to act out of a sense of charitable pity, efforts to
export the “rule of law,” moved by others’ perceived lack, become selfjustifying. Nader’s work could be seen as building on Boas’s project,
deploying the concept of culture to explore dubious inferences about origins of
perceived inferiority in material conditions or systems of ideas.
This is where we see an advantage to reassembling pieces of the puzzle
Kuper has had us take apart. Both Boas’s and Nader’s argumentation shows
how the culture, conceptualized holistically, can challenge certain forms of
cognitive bias. In these interrelationships, traceable because of a holistic
consideration of difference, the workings of power to shape the frame within
which discourses are produced become more visible.
C. Bringing Comparison Home: Culture in Comparative Law
In the previous Parts, after cautioning against troubles that can result from
misuse of the concept of culture, I attempted to show how tools developed to
study culture might be used in comparative law. I suggest that the tools of
anthropology might be adapted for use in comparative law, and advocate two
different steps. The first would be to take Kuper’s suggestion to analyze
components of culture relevant to a given problem. The second would be to
reassemble as many components as one can synthesize to get a more holistic
picture of how both problem and solutions get produced.
To outline the analytic that could result from my proposals, let us consider
as an example a hypothetical project researching the mystery Tribe’s work
raises, how a Constitution constitutes. The investigator could look with
specificity at a particular component of culture, authorized speech acts like
laws or constitutions, to analyze probabilities that certain elements occur in
relation to one another: for example, the probability of a relationship
between certain assertions and certain signals of acceptance (as constitutional,

76. See generally UGO MATTEI AND LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS
ILLEGAL (2008).
77. See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHICS OF NATION
BUILDING (2004) (explaining Feldman’s own participation in the U.S.-installed Coalition
Provisional Authority after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in an effort to draft a new Iraqi constitution,
and calling for a more humble approach to U.S. efforts at “nation-building”); see also Kareem
Fahim, Have a Nice Country, THE VILLAGE VOICE (June 22, 2004), http://www.villagevoice.
com/2004-06-22/news/have-a-nice-country/1/ (describing Feldman’s drafting efforts).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

SAGES, SAVAGES, AND OTHER SPEECH ACT COMMUNITIES

427

legally binding, or authoritative). She could then identify ideologies—
formulated as precepts or propositions—that have become instrumental in their
institutionalization, as Tribe has done, and infer, as Tribe has also done,
cognitive processes that may have given rise to those propositions and
precepts. This would provide adequate grounding to step back and examine the
frames of performance in which authority and convention are produced, to
ascertain whose speech acts hold authority and why, or which ideologies end
up within an “invisible Constitution,” which do not, and why.
This process could end up telling us something about how a given
constitution, including its unwritten dimensions, constitutes. Culture, instead of
being a peremptory answer, then becomes a heuristic, a means to
understanding, frames of performance within which discourse produces literal
meaning and in parallel produces and reproduces speech act communities. To
speak more generally, examining component parts of culture can illuminate
broader processes like the constitution of power, authority, or ideology; or
probabilities of acceptance, rejection, reiteration, breakdown, or
institutionalization.
CONCLUSION
Althusser points out for us that to continue producing something, one must
reproduce the thing itself but one must also reproduce the things that are
necessary for reproduction.78 To continue producing shoes, one must not only
continue making shoes; there must be a system for reproducing leather, laces,
lasts, and even the know-how and workforce that fashions those materials into
shoes. Likewise, to reproduce discourse, one must not only produce the
discourse itself but also the things necessary for discursive production. In not
looking at what produces the frame within which discourse is produced—in
not looking at how the propositions that make up his “invisible Constitution”
get produced—Tribe and others wishing to understand how invisible
Constitutions constitute miss out on something fundamentally constitute:
power.
Comparative law has traditionally suffered, at least in the United States,
from overly restricting itself to geographically based jurisdictions as its unit of
analysis, as the performance frame on which it relies to define its subject. The
traditional comparative law project would be to compare some aspect of the
law of different jurisdictions, say, the law of France to the law of China. The
utility of thinking about culture, when we are thinking through questions of
law, religion, and invisible constitutions, is that culture allows us to slice at a
different angle. It opens the door to new projects; we can compare the speech

78. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes towards an
Investigation, in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 85, 86 (2001).
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acts of a religious community to the speech acts of a legal community within
one locale and see where there are overlaps, where there are not. Among other
benefits, whereas comparative law has traditionally concentrated on different
jurisdictional practices, the concept of culture and other tools of anthropology
developed to investigate particular components of culture allow us to bring
comparison home and to look comparatively at frames of discursive
performance that constitute communities of speech, and forms of authority and
power within them.

